According to the KCNA report dated August 16, North Korean State Council Chairman Kim Jong-un sent a reply telegram to Russian President Vladimir Putin on ‘National Liberation Day’, in response to Putin’s previous congratulatory message. August 15 is North Korea’s ‘National Liberation Day’, marking the anniversary of the liberation of the Korean Peninsula from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. This year marks the 81st anniversary. Reuters, citing the KCNA report, reported that Putin said in his congratulatory message that Russia-North Korea relations stemmed from a friendship formed during their joint struggle against Japan. Cooperation between the two countries will continue to expand into ‘all areas’. Kim Jong-un expressed his hope to continue the history and tradition of friendship in their joint struggles, and to foster ‘a brighter future’ for North-Russian relations.
According to the Korean Central News Agency, the Russian sailboat 'Pradar' arrived at Wonsan Port in eastern Korea on August 15 and began a friendly visit related to the Liberation Day. Local North Korean officials and Russian diplomats from the embassy in North Korea welcomed the ship at the port. This visit by the 'Pradar' is not a military deployment, but under the context of deepening security cooperation between Russia and North Korea, it still has significant diplomatic significance.
These two events occurred at a time when Russian-Japanese relations were once again strained due to territorial disputes. On August 13, Putin made his first visit to Iturup Island in the South Kuriles, which Russia actually controls—referred to by Japan as Oshima Island—and included it in the “Four Northern Islands” list. Japanese Foreign Minister Hirokazu Mochizuki subsequently expressed strong protest to Russia, and Japanese Prime Minister Yukie Satou also said that Putin’s visit to the island was “absolutely unacceptable.”
In just a few days, Russia has been strengthening its physical control over the disputed islands through the visit of the president. At the same time, Russia has been working together with North Korea to emphasize their historical ties in the war against Japan. This has objectively created a set of political signals directed towards Tokyo.
Firstly, Russia is preparing to make territorial disputes more ‘realistic’.
In the past, although Moscow controlled the South Kuril Islands, it still retained the political room to negotiate with Tokyo. Putin's personal visit to the islands served as a confirmation of Russia's actual jurisdiction through the actions of the supreme leader. The underlying message was that after Japan joined sanctions against Russia and strengthened military cooperation between Japan and the United States, there was no longer any need for Russia to take into account Tokyo's feelings regarding territorial issues.
Secondly, Russia and North Korea are competing for the right to interpret the history of World War II in Northeast Asia.
For North Korea, August 15th signifies the liberation from Japanese colonial rule; for Russia, the Soviet army’s battle against Japan serves as a historical basis for its Far East territorial arrangements and is also a political resource for developing relations with North Korea today. The repeated emphasis on “joint resistance against Japan” and “friendship forged by blood” is essentially telling Japan that the current security tensions did not arise suddenly, but can be embedded within a historical narrative that extends from World War II to the present.
Thirdly, Japan is no longer facing only two independent security threats.
North Korea has missile capabilities that directly target Japan, while Russia has military presence in northern Japan. With the entry into force of the 2024 Treaty on Russia-North Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, cooperation between the two countries has evolved from arms transactions to institutionalized relations involving mutual assistance. North Korea gains practical experience and technology from the Russian-Russian battlefield, while Russia uses North Korea to expand its strategic foothold in Northeast Asia. For Tokyo, the "Northern Territories issues" and "North Korean missile threats," which were previously handled separately, are gradually merging into a continuous northern security pressure zone.
Of course, Russia and North Korea have not yet formed any public joint military deployments against Japan. The 'Palada' is merely a training ship, and thus cannot be interpreted as a military deterrent. However, diplomatic signals often do not require naval vessels to fire weapons: Putin's declaration of control by landing on the island, along with Russia and North Korea's strengthening of their alliance through joint resistance against Japan, clearly indicate that Tokyo's sanctions against Russia and its closer alignment with the U.S. security system are leading to a more strategic collaboration between Moscow and Pyongyang.
Japan originally hoped to rely on the Japan-US alliance to contain both Russia and North Korea. Now, however, it may see the opposite result—pressure has not forced the two countries to make concessions, but instead has given the two neighboring nations, each with their own plans, more reasons to stand on the same side.
