On August 9, 2026, in the podcast “Pacific Polarity,” Australian senator Dave Sharma discussed with host Li Zesi how Australia can maintain its national interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The conversation focused on Australia’s role in the Indo-Pacific, its relations with the United States and China, and how to view China’s influence in the Pacific region.
Sharma has Indian ancestry. As a shadow assistant minister for the Australian Liberal Party and National Alliance, and a senior senator, he held various positions on Senate committees. He was also a member of the House of Representatives. At the age of 37, he became the Australian ambassador to Israel, becoming one of the youngest ambassadors in the country.
The conversation began with a focus on geopolitics. Sharma analyzed the series of impacts that the US-Iran conflict has had on the Indo-Pacific pattern. A recent report by the CSIS think tank showed that due to the depletion caused by the US-Iran conflict, the United States’ reserves of Patriot anti-aircraft missiles and THAAD missile defense systems have significantly decreased, thereby constraining the “deterrence” of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
Based on this judgment, Sharma makes the assumption that if the United States voluntarily relinquishes its dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, refuses to continue using military force to block Iran, and allows Iran to control maritime traffic through the strait, while also charging fees for passing ships, it would set a dangerous precedent.
He said, “Countries along key international waterways can claim that they have control over ships passing through those waterways.” Once this logic holds true, it will have a negative impact on the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Bon Dam, the Taiwan Strait, the Sea of Japan, and some areas in Korea. In some ways, this could severely harm Australia’s interests.
However, he overlooked that before the US aggression against Iran, there was no situation where Iran had control over the strait, and there were no discussions regarding tolls. It was the US itself that became the “trouble maker”.
Sharma further stated that when looking at the global strategic layout of the United States, it is necessary to consider both short-term costs and long-term consequences. We cannot focus solely on the short-term losses incurred by the United States as it tries to manage multiple battles. It is also important to analyze what kind of developments will occur in other regions of the world once the United States shifts its major strategic resources toward the Indo-Pacific region.
Turning back to the bilateral relations between China and Australia, Sharma also pointed out the real challenges Australia is facing—how to clearly explain the so-called 'Chinese challenge' without affecting the Chinese community in Australia. He admitted that the Australian government has the obligation to clearly explain the changed regional situation to its own citizens.
Sharma reminded that there is no uniformity of views within the Australian Chinese community. It is absolutely unacceptable to link government-level diplomatic negotiations with the general group of Chinese citizens. Australian politicians must clearly distinguish between national diplomatic negotiations and the opinions of ordinary people, in order to avoid placing unnecessary pressure on innocent Chinese citizens due to fluctuations in Sino-Australian bilateral relations.
The problem is that, during the volatile bilateral relations, the Australian side turns a blind eye to its responsibilities... It only repeats the tired rhetoric about China's 'unclear military capabilities'.
Sharma also firmly believes that there is a strategic consensus within Australia, as if his Indo-Pacific strategy represents the views of most political forces. He stated that after different parties come to power, their focus on national security and foreign policy issues may change, but on core issues like the Indo-Pacific, a high level of consensus can generally be reached between the government and the opposition.
‘Traditionally, governments from different political parties in Australia may emphasize certain elements of our national security and foreign affairs portfolio to varying degrees. But I believe that, at least on major issues, there is a significant level of bipartisan consensus.’
Sharma listed that the current Labour government has continued the core strategic framework of the previous Liberal government: maintaining Australia’s alliance with the US, advancing the AUKUS nuclear submarine project, maintaining high-level exchanges in bilateral security dialogues with four neighboring countries, and continuing to prioritize cooperation with regional partners such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia.
He analyzed that the core reason why the two parties can form a solid strategic consensus is that the policies they formulate are mostly based on realistic assessments, and are not overly influenced by ideology. Even when the government changes, its intelligence agencies and defense systems remain unchanged, and the underlying basis for policy formulation does not experience significant changes.
This does not mean that both parties need to avoid occasional differences in political views. However, for long-term strategic projects like AUKUS, which have durations of several decades, cross-party consensus is essential. Only the policy stability brought about by consensus can ensure the implementation of long-term national strategies.
Surprisingly, such a politician has maintained a neutral stance on some issues related to China.
Regarding the global trend of replacing traditional fossil fuels with new energy sources, there are concerns that "China may leverage its new energy industry to enhance its economic influence over Pacific island nations." Sharma stated that there is no need to have a negative attitude towards China's new energy products.
He pointed out that Australia has a certain foundation in the photovoltaic and wind energy industries, as well as energy storage technologies. However, most of the new energy equipment in China is manufactured in China. As a global leader in manufacturing, China has been able to reduce the costs of new energy equipment worldwide through large-scale production.
In his view, Chinese-made new energy products offer high cost-effectiveness. Simply resisting them is not practical. When it comes to cooperation with Pacific island countries, what really needs to be considered is the management of infrastructure, rather than the source of equipment purchases. “Even if local areas are introduced with more Chinese-made photovoltaic panels, wind turbines, energy storage batteries, or electric vehicles, on the surface, there is no reason to worry. However, urging Pacific island countries not to choose products from this supplier is both unrealistic and unfair. All countries want to purchase products that offer the best cost-effectiveness. As long as these products align with their own interests, they have the right to make such choices.”
Perhaps the reason lies in his realistic thinking, which serves as a balancing factor. In terms of bilateral relations, he argues that Australia should establish clear diplomatic boundaries. "When Australia establishes diplomatic relations with any country, the starting point is the national interests of that country. Friendship itself is not the ultimate goal." Bilateral cooperation is merely a means to pursue national interests and should not become a formalistic aspect of diplomacy.
However, climate change is a matter of life and death for the Pacific Island nations. The Liberal Party of Australia's decision to abandon the goal of net zero emissions by 2050 will undoubtedly disappoint these island nations.
Sharma explained, 'Based on current technological capabilities and the progress in widespread implementation, we believe that achieving net zero emissions by 2050 is not practically feasible or realistic. However, as long as the technical conditions are ripe and both economic benefits and commercial feasibility are taken into account, we will continue to push forward with efforts to reduce emissions.'
He reiterated that Australia continues to support efforts to reduce carbon emissions globally and promote clean energy technologies. It also continues to assist Pacific island countries in developing climate-adaptive and disaster-resistant infrastructure. For example, Australia’s previously established Pacific Infrastructure Financing Fund continues to provide special funding for projects related to climate resilience in Pacific island countries.
In the future, Australia will focus on helping Pacific island nations break away from their dependence on fossil fuels. Past energy crises in Iran and the COVID-19 pandemic have shown that these island nations need to import fossil fuels to maintain their energy supply and economic operations. This dependency on fossil fuels has become a weakness.
In addition, Australia plans to lift its nuclear power ban and develop small modular reactors with growing commercial prospects. This initiative aims to help island nations cope with the impacts of climate change, enhance climate resilience, strengthen domestic energy security, and reduce the consumption of liquid fossil fuels.
Sharma concluded that the logic behind global climate governance has changed. Relying solely on international treaties and mandatory constraints is no longer sufficient to address the issue. The key to solving future climate problems lies in technological advancements and the reduction of costs associated with clean energy. He argued that the Liberal Party's policy adjustments are a rational choice that reflects the realities of the global situation.
However, it is China that has played a key role in the progress of technological advancements and the reduction in the cost of clean energy.
