The author has recently participated in several workshops, forums, and dialogues with European scholars in Stockholm and Brussels. During these events, many discussions regarding China were heard within the European strategic community. These discussions are strikingly similar to the strategic debates surrounding China that took place in Washington about a decade ago. At that time, the American strategic community gradually reached a consensus: the policy of engaging with China over the past few decades had not achieved its intended goals, and the United States needed to shift from engagement to competition with China. This change in perception ultimately became an important turning point in the evolution of U.S. policy towards China, leading to a shift towards strategic competition.
Europe, although not yet arriving at the same conclusion as the United States, has seen more and more European strategic figures start discussing topics such as "China impact," "economic security," "industry resilience," "strategic dependence," "critical mineral safety," and "technological sovereignty." The focus of discussion has shifted from deepening cooperation to managing risks. This shift compels us to consider: Is the China-Europe relationship also approaching a "tipping point"?
Author Sun Chenghao spoke at the Stockholm China Forum
Of course, there is not just one view of China in Europe today, and there are different opinions within it. Some people emphasize economic security and strategic autonomy, believing that security has become a prerequisite for openness. Others express concerns about China's industrial policies, so-called overcapacity, and the "China shock," arguing that Europe is facing new competitive pressures. Still, others advocate for moving beyond the narrative of "systemic competition" and emphasize the need for a new framework for coexistence between China and Europe. In other words, what Europe is discussing today is not whether to adjust its policies towards China, but how far such adjustments should go.
Ultimately, there are three noteworthy changes taking place in Europe's perception of China.
First, China is increasingly being incorporated into European security perspectives. For a long time, Sino-European relations have focused primarily on economic fields; even when there are disagreements, they mostly revolve around trade, investment and market access. However, in recent years, Europe has been increasingly inclined to understand China from a security perspective. Whether it's electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, or data flow and digital infrastructure, more issues are being given security connotations.
This change actually reflects Europe’s internal dilemmas. On one hand, Europe emphasizes “risk reduction” rather than “decoupling” from China, and does not wish to enter into a complete confrontation with China. On the other hand, the expanding concept of economic security has led to more and more issues related to China being considered within the context of security considerations. This security logic may gradually overshadow economic rationality and room for cooperation. Without clear boundaries, “risk reduction” could ultimately lead to broader economic alienation between China and Europe.
Secondly, Europe's concerns about China are shifting from individual industries to the entire ecosystem. During this visit to Europe, one key term that was repeatedly mentioned is 'systemic'. In the past, conflicts between China and Europe often centered on single industries, such as photovoltaics, electric vehicles, or steel. However, today Europe is paying more attention to the entire industrial ecosystem, focusing on China's impact at a systemic level. Many European strategic analysts no longer view supply chains, critical minerals, data governance, artificial intelligence, and technical standards as isolated issues, but rather as different components of the same strategic system.
This change means that relations between China and Europe are transitioning from an era of "industry competition" to an era of "ecological competition". Europe is no longer viewing China merely as a competitor in a specific industry, but increasingly considers China as a competitor in a complete economic and technological ecosystem.
On June 2, the Financial Times reported that 'EU member states are carefully moving towards trade confrontation with China, while at the same time striving to avoid drawing the attention of the Chinese side.'
This change is particularly evident in the field of artificial intelligence. Europe is both concerned about the market dominance of American tech giants and keeps a wary eye on Chinese technology companies. However, the issue lies in the fact that competition in artificial intelligence is essentially a competition of technical ecosystems, involving multiple dimensions such as chips, computing power, data, talent, capital, application scenarios, and governance rules. Although Europe has advantages in regulation and standard setting, it lags significantly behind China and the United States in areas such as foundational models, cloud services, and the capital market. A question that deserves serious consideration by Europe is: what is the true goal of Europe's artificial intelligence strategy? If Europe wishes to become the "third pole" in the global artificial intelligence ecosystem, while also maintaining a high degree of vigilance and distance from the United States and China, then how can this goal be achieved?
Thirdly, Europe is redefining its international role. The Ukraine crisis, Trump’s re-entry into the White House, and intensifying global industrial competition have brought the discussion around European strategic autonomy to a new stage. It is noteworthy that Trump’s impact on transatlantic relations is not merely short-term. In the future, no matter who takes over the White House, US-European relations will be unlikely to return to their state from a decade ago. Trends such as the redistribution of security responsibilities, the return of industrial policies, intensified technological competition, and the rise of economic nationalism have already transcended Trump individually and have profoundly reshaped Europe’s understanding of America, the world, and its own role.
From a Chinese perspective, this means that Europe is striving to become an more independent strategic entity, rather than just a component of the "Western bloc". For China, this is both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity lies in the fact that a more autonomous Europe may have more room to formulate policies towards China that are in line with its own interests. The challenge, on the other hand, is that a more autonomous Europe may also be more proactive in protecting its economic and technological interests, adopting tougher positions in areas such as industrial policy, trade protection, and technical regulation. In other words, strategic autonomy does not automatically mean an "pro-China" Europe, but it does mean that the importance of "European attitudes" in Sino-European relations is increasing.
However, will the development trajectory of China-Europe relations necessarily repeat that of China-US relations? Not necessarily.
The author, Sun Chenghao, spoke at a conference in Brussels.
In this conversation, a striking phenomenon is that despite many European scholars expressing increasing concerns about China, they still discuss issues related to “coexistence” and “cooperation”. Whether it’s establishing crisis management mechanisms, promoting investment cooperation, strengthening governance coordination in artificial intelligence, or seeking areas of cooperation in areas such as climate change, energy transformation, Middle East stability, and development in the Global South, many participants are actually exploring a new way of coexistence between China and Europe. This is a significant difference from the consensus that emerged in the U.S. strategic circles a decade ago, which was that “competition outweighs cooperation”.
Most people involved in the conversation believe that there are common interests between China and Europe, and the key lies in how these interests can be translated into concrete actions. In this regard, China and Europe can actively explore some practical approaches: instead of discussing grand strategic visions, it is better to start with specific projects, such as jointly implementing green energy and climate adaptation programs in developing countries; instead of focusing on the most sensitive issues, it is better to prioritize cooperation in less politically sensitive areas like artificial intelligence security governance, food security, public health, and humanitarian aid; instead of waiting for crises to occur before communicating, it is better to establish institutionalized communication mechanisms at the working level and crisis management systems.
Ten years ago, mutual distrust regarding each other’s strategic intentions deepened between China and the United States. More and more economic issues were treated as security-related matters, and many cooperation issues became politicized. This ultimately led to a generalized competitive logic. Today, China-Europe relations have not yet reached this stage, but certain signs are already appearing. Instead of debating whether China-Europe has entered a competitive era, a more worthy question is how to prevent China-Europe from repeating the same trajectory as Sino-US relations. Europe is currently experiencing its own “China debate,” but it has not yet reached the conclusions reached by the United States ten years ago. Perhaps this is the greatest opportunity for current China-Europe relations.
Therefore, the real issue is not whether there are differences between China and Europe, but whether both sides can establish sufficient communication mechanisms and strengthen bilateral trust before reaching a “critical point”, thereby keeping competition within manageable limits. If this is not achieved, the current discussions regarding “Chinese challenge,” “economic security,” and “systemic competition” could potentially turn into strategic confrontations between China and Europe in the future. Conversely, there is still a chance for China-Europe relations to avoid becoming what is called strategic competition. This is precisely the significance of today’s discussion on whether “China-Europe relations have reached a critical point.”
