Eleven years ago I refused to fight for Saudi Arabia's Yemen, this time will I really act?
On October 8th, Pakistani military spokesman Lieutenant General Ahmad Sherif Jodori confirmed that Pakistani soldiers are serving in Saudi Arabia with 'a variety of capabilities and fields'.
A few days ago, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey decided to launch the “Mecca Defense Agreement,” rapidly deploying agreed-upon military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia in order to respond to the increasingly frequent missile and drone attacks by the Houthis. Reuters further reported that Pakistan has agreed to send additional forces to Saudi Arabia on top of what is already planned.
This means that the Mecca Defense Agreement signed by the three nations on August 7th has already begun to transform from mere paper commitments into actual military deployments.
The most notable feature of this agreement is a typical collective defense clause: any armed attack against one member will be considered an attack against all members.
On October 5th, the three countries held an emergency meeting in Riyadh to officially launch the collective deterrence mechanism and decided to promptly provide Saudi Arabia with the agreed troops and military capabilities. Turkey also began providing support for defensive tasks, including air defense systems, drone operators, intelligence, and logistics.
Calling it the "Islamic NATO" is certainly an exaggeration. The Three Nations currently do not have a mature joint command system like NATO, nor do they have a military integration mechanism that has been developed over decades. But at least one thing has occurred: the concept of "one country under attack, other members providing military support" is no longer just a diplomatic term.
Pakistan's actions best prove this point.
Because 11 years ago, facing the war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, Pakistan made a completely different choice.
After Saudi Arabia launched military operations in Yemen in 2015, it formally requested Pakistan to provide warships, fighter jets, and ground forces. After five days of debate, the Pakistani Parliament unanimously passed a resolution calling on the government to remain neutral in the Yemen war. Although the resolution also promised that if Saudi territory or the two holy places of Mecca and Medina were threatened, Pakistan would stand 'side by side' with Saudi Arabia, the boundaries at that time were very clear: defending Saudi Arabia was acceptable, but directly engaging in the Yemen war was not.
11 years have passed, and this line is becoming blurred.
In fact, Pakistan has been sending troops to Saudi Arabia for several decades. In September 2025, the two countries signed a joint defense agreement. As of May this year, Reuters reported that Pakistan had deployed approximately 8,000 military personnel to Saudi Arabia, a squadron consisting of around 16 JF-17 fighter jets, drone units, and an HQ-9 air defense system. This far exceeds what is typically considered a traditional military advisory team.
The real new development is that this time, Pakistan’s increased forces have been officially included in a trilateral collective defense framework established to address actual military conflicts.
What is even more intriguing is the change in procedures. Whether to send troops to Saudi Arabia in 2015 required a public debate in parliament; this time, however, there was no similar parliamentary vote. The Pakistani government stated that all necessary government procedures had been completed, but did not specify to what extent parliament or even the cabinet was involved. Reuters believes this reflects the growing influence of the military under Marshal Asim Munir in Pakistan’s foreign and security policies.
Of course, we cannot simply say that “Pakistan has joined the Yemen war”.
Currently, there is no publicly available information regarding the number of additional troops involved, nor is their command structure, deployment schedule, or combat rules disclosed. Information obtained by Reuters at the beginning of October still indicates that Pakistan and Turkey mainly provide equipment, advisors, and defensive support, while the ground attacks are carried out by the Yemeni government forces. Therefore, the real turning point will be whether the Pakistani military will directly enter Yemen or participate in attacks against the Houthi militant group.
This is also the most dangerous balance in Islamabad. Behind Houthi is Iran, and Pakistan not only borders Iran, but it also plays an important role in mediating conflicts between the United States and Iran. Once Pakistani forces shift from "defending Saudi Arabia" to "directly targeting Houthi", Islamabad will find it difficult to continue acting as a security partner for Saudi Arabia and a mediator in wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
For Saudi Arabia, the logic is even clearer.
Riyadh does not intend to replace the United States with Pakistan and Turkey. Instead, it seeks to add an additional layer of security within its own region, outside of the umbrella of American protection. The Shaba Common Defense Agreement in 2025, the Mecca Trilateral Agreement in 2026, and this actual deployment all point in the same direction: Saudi Arabia is no longer willing to rely solely on a single external power for its national security.
Therefore, whether Pakistan sent thousands or just a few hundred more soldiers is not the most important issue.
What is truly noteworthy is that Pakistan, which refused to participate in the Yemen war in 2015, is changing. For the first time, Saudi Arabia has a regional collective defense mechanism that can effectively mobilize forces after being attacked.
It is still impossible to determine whether the "Mecca Defense Agreement" is merely a temporary security alliance or another military system that will exist in the Middle East in the long term.
But at least after the Houla missiles were launched again towards Saudi Arabia, they moved for the first time.
