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China Builds Sixth Research Station in Antarctica: Raising Security Concerns

China is preparing to place another ‘piece’ in Antarctica.

According to a report by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) on September 27, China plans to build its sixth Antarctic research station at Cox Point in Marie Byrd Land in southwestern Antarctica as early as 2027. Unlike the Qinling Station, which will be operational throughout the year starting in 2024, the new station is scheduled to be a seasonal research station that will only operate during the Antarctic summer. The research areas include ice sheet changes, interactions between oceans and the atmosphere, climate change, spatial physics, and geology.

The construction of the new research station is not a secret. China has already submitted a comprehensive environmental assessment in accordance with the procedures specified by the Antarctic Treaty environmental protocol. Public documents show that China has conducted on-site surveys at Cox Point in southwestern Antarctica for several years, and plans to continue environmental baseline surveys, test modular floating docks, and transport some prefabricated station materials during the 2025/26 Antarctic summer season. The initial plan is to complete the construction within two Antarctic summers, with the station expected to be put into use in 2027.

But the discussions sparked by this project in Australia have clearly gone beyond the scope of science itself.

Australian independent senator Jacqui Lambie has publicly called for the defense sector to be more vigilant. Elizabeth Buchanan, a senior researcher at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), proposed a concept called “polar independence”. She is concerned not only about whether a particular research station will be militarized, but also about how China, if it has more widespread bases, its own icebreakers, air transportation, communication systems, and satellite networks, may become less dependent on countries like Australia, which serve as “poles to the Antarctic.”

This reflects Australia's long-standing anxiety.

Currently, Chinese polar research vessels such as the “Xuelong” and “Xuelong 2” still use Australian ports like Hobart and Fremantle for supplies. In the past two years, Hobart alone has hosted multiple stops by Chinese icebreakers. The government of Tasmania even offered to use local facilities for supplies by Chinese polar research institutions. Meanwhile, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade refused to make public certain documents related to the use of Australian ports by Chinese research vessels this year, citing one reason as protecting national security.

In other words, Australia's past advantage in the Antarctic system did not solely come from having three stations operating throughout the year. It also came from port facilities, supplies, scientific research, and logistics services provided by gateway cities like Hobart.

If a major country gradually controls all these capabilities in its own hands, the space in which smaller countries can exert influence will naturally shrink.

This is also why China’s sixth Antarctic station may not seem particularly 'militaryized', yet it still triggers Australia's security concerns.

The so-called “dual-use” does have an objective basis. Satellite communications, drones, aircraft, and remote sensing equipment can be used for research on glaciers, meteorology, and geology, as well as for other purposes. However, having a dual-use capability is a different issue from engaging in military activities. There is currently no public evidence indicating that the new station at Cox Point was designed as a military base; moreover, it is a summer station. Tony Press, former head of the Australian Antarctic Survey, believes that interpreting China’s expansion in Antarctica as a direct military threat or preparation for mining is an exaggeration. In his view, it is more realistic to think that China wants to prove its status as a major participant in Antarctic affairs through scientific facilities located across different regions.

The Antarctic Treaty itself establishes an important restriction: Antarctica must be used only for peaceful purposes. Military bases, military exercises, and weapons testing are prohibited. The contracting parties can also inspect the Antarctic sites, facilities, and equipment of other countries. At the same time, the treaty allows military personnel and military equipment to be used for peaceful purposes such as scientific research.

Therefore, what truly deserves attention about the sixth station is not a question as simple as 'whether it will become a military base'.

A more significant change is that, after more than forty years of development, China has transformed from a latecomer who relied on the existing Antarctic system for scientific research, into a polar power with scientific stations, icebreakers, air transportation, satellite communications, and an independent logistics network.

For Australia, this represents a subtle strategic change: The past issue was “how to manage China’s entry into Antarctica with Australian support”; the future question may become—when China becomes more capable of entering Antarctica on its own, supplying itself, and communicating on its own, what will Australia still have to rely on to maintain its influence?

This might be closer to the core of this controversy than whether a scientific research station has any “military purposes”.

In fact, China has not taken any actions that go beyond the realm of science. However, Australians are eager to frame discussions about Antarctica in terms of politics and interests. This is what is truly eroding the purity of Antarctic research that has been carried out over the past few decades.