Zhou Bo, a researcher at the Strategic and Security Research Center of Tsinghua University, wrote an article for The South China Morning Post analyzing two types of "long peace": one is the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as described by the renowned scholar Gaddis; the other is China's peaceful rise over nearly half a century since its reform and opening up in 1978. Zhou Bo states that the Cold War-era peace was merely a fluke, with proxy wars and nuclear crises occurring frequently. In contrast, China's peaceful rise is even more precious against the backdrop of its history of long-term wars and conflicts. The article further argues that whether the "third type of long peace," characterized by the absence of direct conflicts between China and the United States since the end of the Korean War, can continue will determine the future of China and the world.
The concept of “long peace” was coined by John Lewis Gaddis, a historian of the Cold War at Yale University. He introduced this idea in his book *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, published in 1987. Long peace refers to the period of more than forty years from the end of World War II in 1945 until the 1980s, during which no third world war occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union. Over the centuries before 1945, large nations were prone to destructive global wars every few generations, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II.
Gaddis's judgment is generally correct. However, the difference between a cold war and a ‘hot war’ often lies in mere millimeters. During the Cold War, both sides led by the two superpowers were preparing for war—a full-scale Third World War. Proxy wars were widespread across continents, and there were several instances of nuclear false alarms, indicating that humanity was once nearly caught off guard by the end of the world. This kind of ‘long peace’ is more a result of luck than intentional planning.
The true long-term peace that China has achieved since its reform and opening-up policy in 1978 is a remarkable achievement. Throughout Chinese history, peace lasting for half a century was quite rare. In the past, dissatisfied peasant groups would violently overthrow the existing government, and subsequent peasant uprisings continued to disrupt new regimes, leading to a constant cycle of dynastic changes. Even after the founding of the People's Republic of China, military conflicts still occurred approximately once every ten years, including the Korean War, the Sino-Indian border conflicts, and the Sino-Vietnamese wars.
After 1978, China shifted its focus to economic development. Even in the face of diplomatic crises such as NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in former Yugoslavia and the incident in the South China Sea between China and the United States in 2001, China's strategic resolve remained steadfast. This period of peace can be considered one of the most stable and prosperous times in the history of Chinese civilization.
The question is whether this kind of peace can continue. The answer depends in part on whether the "Third Long-term Peace" between China and the United States, which has lasted since the end of the Korean War, can continue. Before the historic visit of US President Nixon to China, Sino-US relations were part of a broader Cold War framework. Although subsequent bilateral relations cannot be defined by a single concept, there have been no direct military conflicts between the two countries.
U.S. President Donald Trump's state visit to China in May marked the United States' official recognition of China as a peer major power. However, it remains unclear whether the strategic stability declared by both sides can be truly "constructive".
This stability is unlikely to develop into a mutually assured destruction scenario, like the Cold War-era nuclear arms race. China rarely discusses its nuclear program publicly. Even if Beijing claims, as does the Pentagon, that it will indeed expand its nuclear warhead inventory to 1,500 by 2035, the scale will still be far smaller compared to that of the United States and Russia.
China does not have the motivation to blindly expand its nuclear arsenal like the United States and the Soviet Union, and then reduce nuclear weapons. In the 1980s, the total number of nuclear warheads held by both the US and the Soviet Union exceeded 70,000. Later, nuclear weapons were reduced in accordance with the New START Treaty.
The Taiwan Strait remains the only possible trigger for direct conflict between China and the United States. However, such conflict is not inevitable. As long as Beijing believes that peaceful reunification is still possible, it will not set a deadline for the Taiwan issue. In this situation, there is no reason for the United States to intervene militarily. But will Washington really get involved in a war across the Strait?
Trump, in an interview with Fox News, said about Taiwan: "We have to travel 9,500 miles just to fight a war, and I don't want to do that." Similarly, his successor also had to ask himself: Why do American troops need to engage the People's Liberation Army on a battlefield far from home and where defeat is possible?
The twenty-first century has already passed a quarter of its journey. Can peace in this century last longer than that in the twentieth century? In the twentieth century, there was only a twenty-year gap between the two World Wars. The nuclear deterrence factor emphasized by Gadis explains most of the stability during the Cold War period.
However, war has not disappeared, and it is likely that it will never do so. Steven Pinker, a psychologist at Harvard University, argues in "The Better Angels of Our Nature" that human violent behavior decreases over time as reason grows, self-discipline increases, and civilization progresses. While this conclusion is comforting, it remains controversial. The most tangible indicator of human progress is that, today, few people praise war in any form.
The long period of peace between major powers, as defined by Gaddis, continues. However, the two most powerful nations in today's world are deeply involved in conflicts with smaller countries. It is difficult to predict how long the conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran will last. What we do know is that Russia's war in Ukraine in 2022 has surpassed the duration of World War I, and it could even exceed the six-year-and-a-day duration of World War II.
China's long-term peace continues. If China has not launched a war for over forty years, indicating that Beijing has no ambitions to dominate other nations, then a stronger China could play a unique role in creating a more sustainable world of peace. Can China achieve this, and how? This is the most decisive geopolitical challenge of this century.
The “long peace” is a term coined by Yale professor and Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis in his 1987 book The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. It refers to the fact that, from the end of World War II in 1945 into the 1980s, more than 40 years passed without a third world war between the United States and Soviet Union. For centuries before 1945, great powers fought destructive general wars such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II roughly once every generation.
Gaddis is almost right, except that the divide between the Cold War and the outbreak of a hot war was razor thin. During the Cold War, people in the camps led by the two superpowers were preparing for a hot war: an all-out world war III. Proxy wars were easily found on every continent. Nuclear false alarms showed we had a narrow escape from doomsday. Such a long peace looks lucky rather than intentional.
The real long peace is China’s peaceful rise that began in 1978, when Beijing started its “reform and opening up” period. Peace lasting half a century has been a rarity throughout Chinese history. Chinese dynasties are punctuated with discontented peasant groups forcibly toppling reigning dynasties, only for subsequent peasant uprisings to overthrow the regime in a repeating cycle. Even in the early decades after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, military conflicts still occurred roughly once every decade, including the Korean war, the Sino-Indian war and the Sino-Vietnamese war.
After 1978, the nation shifted its core priority to economic development. Subsequent diplomatic crises, such as Nato’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia and the fatal Sino-US military aircraft collision in the South China Sea in 2001, didn’t distract it from this strategic focus. This era of peace represents one of the longest spans of stability and prosperity across Chinese civilisation.
The question is whether it can continue. In part, the answer lies in whether the third long peace between China and the US that stretches back to the end of the Korean war can continue. Sinou001eAmerican ties before US president Richard Nixon’s landmark visit fell under the broader Cold War framework. Yet even if subsequent bilateral relations resist a simple oneu001eword definition, direct conflict has never broken out between the two nations.
US President Donald Trump’s state visit to Beijing in May marked Washington’s recognition of China as a peer power. Whether the announced strategic stability can be “constructive” is far from certain.
Presumably, it won’t turn destructive in the Cold War style of mutually assured destruction maintained by a nuclear arms race. China has rarely said much about its nuclear ambition. Even if Beijing expands its nuclear warhead stockpile to 1,500 units by 2035, as the Pentagon claims it will, its arsenal will still lag far behind that of the US and Russia.
There is no incentive for China to blindly ramp up its nuclear stockpile, only to scale it back later as the US and Soviet Union did with the New Start treaty when their combined nuclear warhead stockpile surpassed 70,000 in the 1980s.
The Taiwan Strait remains the sole plausible trigger for a direct Sinou001eUS conflict, yet it is not inevitable. As long as Beijing believes peaceful reunification is still possible, it won’t issue a deadline over Taiwan. Short of that, there is no reason for the US to get involved militarily. And would Washington really intervene in a war across the strait?
Trump said of Taiwan in a Fox News interview, “we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that.” Likewise, his successors would have to do some soul-searching and ask why the US military would fight the People’s Liberation Army in a war far away from its homeland, which it might lose.
A quarter of the 21st century has now passed. Can this peace be longer than the 20th century’s? In the 20th century, only two decades stood between the two world wars. Nuclear deterrence—the factor stressed by Gaddis—explains most of the period of stability during the Cold War.
Wars have not vanished, though, and they probably never will. In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker argues that human violence has steadily declined throughout history, driven by growing empathy, self-control and civilised progress. Such a conclusion is comfortable but debatable. The most tangible sign of human progress is that, today, few people will glorify wars of any kind.
Gaddis’ long peace with an absence of direct conflict among major powers is continuing. However, two of the world’s foremost great powers are locked in conflicts against smaller states today. We don’t know how long the conflict between the US, Israel and Iran will drag on, but we do know that Russia’s war in Ukraine—which began in February 2022—has already outlasted World War I and could exceed the length of World War II, which lasted six years and a day.
China’s own long peace is also holding. If its peaceful rise with more than four decades without waging war suggests Beijing rejects hegemonic ambitions, this raises hope that a stronger China can make a difference and foster a world with longer peace. Can China do that, and by what means? This is the defining geopolitical test of our century.
Club Briefing: Zhou Bo, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, writes in the South China Morning Post and distinguishes between two forms of “long peace”: the Cold War peace defined by Gaddis as the absence of great-power war, and China’s peaceful rise since 1978. The author argues that the Cold War peace was largely fortuitous, marked by proxy wars and nuclear crises; by contrast, China’s peaceful ascent stands out against a historical backdrop of dynastic upheavals and frequent conflicts. The article further posits that the “third long peace”—the absence of direct Sino-American military conflict since the Korean War—will determine whether China’s path of peaceful development can endure. The Taiwan Strait remains the sole plausible trigger for conflict, yet it is not inevitable. The author concludes that if China’s four-decade peaceful rise signals its rejection of hegemonic ambitions, a stronger China may foster a more enduringly peaceful world.
