In recent years, the U.S. government has elevated the issue of key minerals to a significant national strategic level. It continues to emphasize their importance in competition with China. Whoever controls elements such as tungsten, lithium, cobalt, copper, and rare metals will gain an advantage in future technologies, economic development, and defense industries.
Therefore, over the past few years, the United States has been actively promoting what is called key mineral diplomacy, attempting to establish supply chains that bypass China on a global scale. Since 2023, the U.S. has signed memorandums of understanding regarding key minerals with several countries, from Central Asia to Latin America, and even Africa. Despite these frequent diplomatic efforts, these agreements have generally faced difficulties in being implemented in practice over the past few years.
Many of these agreements have never truly gone beyond mere formalities. The American magazine Forbes stated this clearly on its website on June 4th. The pace of U.S. policy announcements far exceeded the actual progress of project implementation. Funding, capacity building for processing capabilities, logistics infrastructure, and the development of downstream industries all lagged significantly behind expectations. Both the partner governments and the market are increasingly aware of the huge gap between rhetoric and actual investment levels in the United States.
Whats the problem?
The article points out that the current strategy of the United States regarding key minerals still follows the principle of mineral priority. This means seeking more raw materials from so-called friendly countries in order to weaken Chinas market influence in the processing of key minerals. According to this logic, as more ore resources are developed in friendly countries, diversified upstream supply will gradually lead to the construction of refining facilities and related industrial chains, thereby creating new industrial ecosystems.
However, the problem lies in the fact that mining development involves not only the construction of mines themselves, but also the need for infrastructure such as railways, ports, processing facilities, export financing, power generation, water supply systems, and long-term procurement agreements. Without these essential infrastructures and industrial supports, new mines often cannot break free from their dependence on existing systems. In contrast, China has built a complete ecosystem over decades in terms of key minerals.
A typical example is the Lobito Corridor project, which is highly anticipated by the West. The goal of this project is to export copper and cobalt resources from Central African countries through Angolas ports to the Atlantic market, with the intention of reducing dependence on China-led infrastructure networks.
However, reality did not unfold as planned by the United States. The Lobito Corridor project progressed slowly, with uneven financing arrangements and limited progress in infrastructure construction. Investors are generally concerned about whether the industrial support systems that will be established around the corridor can actually be established. Some participating countries have even begun to anticipate a possible decrease in U.S. investment and support in the future.
The Zambian government no longer has any high expectations regarding this matter. Congo (Kinshasa), which was once considered by the United States as one of the early achievements in critical mineral diplomacy, has thus far achieved limited cooperation with the US. Chinese companies still hold a dominant position at the core of the local cobalt and copper industry chains.
According to US media reports, the United States has failed not only in its efforts in African emerging markets. In Kazakhstan, which is often referred to as the next key mineral-rich country after Saudi Arabia, the US is also on the verge of failing in its attempts.
Kazakhstan boasts abundant mineral resources, a relatively developed financial system, high political stability, and increasingly strong connections in the international capital market. More importantly, the country is striving to transform itself from merely being a resource exporter into a long-term industrial partner.
At the C5+1 meeting held in November 2025, the United States and five Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, announced plans to deepen economic cooperation. From June 11th to 12th this year, Kazakhstan will also host the Astana International Mining and Metallurgy Conference. Additionally, a C5+1 offline meeting dedicated to critical minerals will be held for the first time.
It is reported that the American investment firm Cove Capital has announced its entry into a project involving one of the worlds largest undeveloped tungsten mineral resources in Kazakhstan. This marks the beginning of a substantial phase of cooperation between the two parties. The project is managed by American companies, with participation from Kazakh state capital. It has also received financing support from the US Export-Import Bank and the US International Development Finance Corporation. In the future, plans are to list the project on NASDAQ for further financing.
According to Forbes analysis, the case of Kazakhstan demonstrates the possibility for U.S. foreign cooperation projects to shift from mere resource extraction to the establishment of complete industrial chains. However, this could also lead to a misjudgment by U.S. policymakers, who might believe that mining ecosystems can be formed naturally.
In fact, Kazakhstans ability to create a relatively well-developed investment environment is largely due to the proactive reforms implemented by its government. In many underdeveloped countries, local governments do not have such capabilities. In these regions, China often provides simultaneous support in terms of financing, infrastructure development, and industrial support. It is unlikely that the United States would be able to make similar commitments.
The article points out that investing in mining industries in emerging markets inevitably involves political and financial risks. However, without long-term commitments, any attempt to restructure the industrial chain is unlikely to succeed. For the United States to establish a truly resilient supply chain for key minerals, it is necessary to invest beyond just mining operations. This includes investing in refining facilities, transportation routes, export ports, power systems, and industrial processing parks, all of which must be integrated into the overall strategic plan.
Otherwise, the same pattern will be repeated. The article warns that U.S. diplomatic efforts will help to open up the situation, and preliminary mining agreements will be finalized. Meanwhile, China will continue to control the key aspects of the value chain. After all, key minerals are not just rocks buried underground; they also determine who can provide funding and support for the industrial ecosystems that develop around these minerals.
