South Korea's unease towards the United States is undergoing a notable change: doubts are no longer coming only from the progressive factions who traditionally advocate for autonomy from the US. Even conservative public opinion, which has long regarded the South Korean-US alliance as the cornerstone of South Korea's security, is beginning to question whether Washington remains a predictable ally.
On the 18th, the North Korea Daily published an editorial titled "South Korean-American Joint Training Should Not Be the Object of Negotiation." A day later, the Central Daily's editorial criticized further, stating that Washington is increasingly focusing on costs and trade considerations rather than shared security interests when dealing with alliances. It was particularly worried that if Trump’s reduction in military exercises were indeed related to South Korea’s slow progress in implementing $350 billion in investments in the US, it would mean that trade, investment, and military security are being placed on the same negotiation list.
The fuse is part of the South Korean-US Joint Military Exercise ‘Artillery-Free Shield’.
On August 16th, just before the military exercises were to begin, U.S. President Trump suddenly demanded that the Pentagon significantly reduce the size of the exercises. He not only complained again about the high costs of the exercises and said that they would send a “hostile signal” to North Korea, but also introduced an unrelated issue: South Korea had previously refused to participate in U.S. military operations against Iran. In the end, the originally scheduled 11-day joint military exercise was shortened to 5 days, with some field training and Phase II exercises being canceled.
What really worried Korean public opinion was not the fact that they had performed for a few days less.
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Sang-hyun stated in the National Assembly on August 19 that the South Korean government did not receive any notice before Trump issued this order, and even the relevant departments within the U.S. government were not aware of the president's decision in advance. In other words, a significant decision involving the South-Korean-U.S. joint combat system was announced by Trump first, and then allies began to coordinate its implementation.
This is exactly what Korean conservatives cannot easily accept.
This concern is not unfounded. Zhao Xian also said on the 19th that Trump’s actions seem to involve pressure on South Korea, including issues related to Iran and the commitment of $350 billion in investments.
This presents the South Korean-US alliance with a problem that goes beyond just 'the scale of military exercises': is the United States trying to manage a long-term security alliance, or is it managing a contract that can be continuously renegotiated?
Trump did this during his first term in office. After the US-DPRK summit in Singapore in 2018, he suspended large-scale military exercises between South Korea and the United States, claiming that such exercises were "expensive and provocative," in exchange for progress on North Korea's nuclear disarmament. However, negotiations between the US and DPRK collapsed later on, and North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities continued to expand. Now, the same logic is emerging again, and it becomes even harder for South Korea to believe that "reducing military exercises in exchange for North Korea's goodwill" will be effective.
More subtly, the criticism from South Korean conservatives does not lead to anti-American sentiments.
"Central Daily Dispatch" criticized the United States for transforming the alliance trade into a one-sided affair, while simultaneously demanding that Lee Jae-myung government prove South Korea is not "a helper-only ally," urging Seoul to fulfill obligations related to investment, trade and the Mallaca Strait.
This precisely demonstrates the severity of the problem.
South Korean conservatives do not wish to distance themselves from the United States. Instead, they are increasingly worried that South Korea is highly dependent on the U.S., and thus cannot afford an unpredictable America.
On the 18th, Lee Jae-myung once again proposed promoting the transfer of wartime combat command authority, strengthening independent defense, and nuclear-powered submarine programs. This has additional implications. South Korea may not be prepared to leave the security system provided by the United States, but it is seeking ways to reduce the risk of a sudden change in U.S. policy.
In the past, when discussing South Korea’s alliance with the United States, the core issue was often whether the United States would protect South Korea.
Now, a new problem is emerging:
Even if the United States still has the ability to protect South Korea, can Seoul be sure that the United States will know in advance when and under what conditions it intends to provide protection? And will it suddenly put South Korea’s security alongside another trade deal and another war on the negotiating table?
When even the most favorable opinions in South Korea regarding joint military exercises began to seriously discuss this issue, what was truly damaged was not just a single joint military exercise, but the alliance's most expensive and difficult to rebuild asset - predictability.
