According to a report by the Japanese Kyodo News, Japan's Defense Minister Shinzo Abe will visit Australia and India from the 17th to the 21st. In India, Abe will hold his first meeting with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. It is expected that both sides will discuss topics such as joint development of drones, transfer of shipborne communication systems, and holding the Japan-India '2+2' talks within this year.
Currently, no specific model, companies, or timeline for drone cooperation have been announced, let alone any orders that have been placed. However, the shift from “selling Japanese equipment to India” to “developing together with India” represents an important change in Japan’s military industry strategy when it comes to expanding overseas.
Japan once believed that by relaxing restrictions on arms exports, India would become the easiest market to enter.
As early as 2014, Japan and India were close to reaching an agreement for the purchase of the US-2 amphibious aircraft. It is said that India plans to purchase at least 15 aircraft, with the contract value potentially reaching $165 million. This would have been a symbolic deal, marking Japan’s first large-scale military aircraft export since World War II. Japan even discussed involving India in the assembly process.
However, more than ten years have passed, and US-2 has still not been included in India's procurement list. Issues related to prices, technology transfer, and local production arrangements remain difficult to resolve.
This failure has exposed the structural shortcomings of Japan's military industry. Japan's equipment technology is not low, but for a long time, it has only produced for the Self-Defense Forces, resulting in limited procurement volumes and high costs. Japanese companies lack overseas marketing, financing, and after-sales service networks, and are not accustomed to transferring technology on a large scale in order to compete for orders.
India is one of the most difficult buyers to deal with. New Delhi is rarely satisfied with imported finished products; instead, it demands that foreign companies transfer technology, set up factories in India, and allow domestic enterprises to enter their supply chains. Japan hopes to exchange technology for market access, while India wishes to exchange markets for technology. Both sides have been involved in this bargaining process for a long time.
Japan's efforts to relax restrictions on military sales have also been limited. In 2016, Japan failed to sell submarines to Australia. It wasn't until 2020 that Mitsubishi Electric sold air defense radar systems to the Philippines, marking the first contract for the export of new defense equipment. In April 2026, Japan further eliminated restrictions on weapon exports, restricting them only to five categories: rescue, transportation, surveillance, monitoring, and mine clearance. This has given warships, missiles, and drones greater export opportunities.
But relaxing rules does not mean that customers will come to you automatically. Japanese military industry still needs to find a more suitable cooperation model for international markets, and India has thus become an important testing ground.
Both parties have already paved the way with the 'UNICORN' project for shipborne communication antennas. In 2024, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding, under which Japan will provide design technology, and India will participate in integration and production. During the summit meeting between Kaesuke Moe and Narendra Modi in July 2026, it was explicitly stated that equipment cooperation would be carried out on the basis of 'Made in India'.
Drones are more suitable than large aircraft and submarines as the next breakthrough option. Their development cycle is relatively short, and they can be used for maritime surveillance in the Indian Ocean, as well as for anti-submarine operations, communication relay services, and combined reconnaissance and attack missions. Japan has the capabilities to provide sensors, communication systems, and precision manufacturing technologies. India, on the other hand, has lower production costs, a large procurement demand, and a growing drone industry.
More importantly, India spans the main routes of the Indian Ocean and also faces long-term strategic competition with China. For Japan, establishing production and maintenance systems in India means not only selling equipment, but also extending its military supply chain and security partnerships into the Indian Ocean.
Of course, India has never been a market where orders can be easily fulfilled. The extent of technological openness, how intellectual property is allocated, and who holds the key components, could still lead to drone projects repeating the same mistakes as the US-2 project.
Therefore, Japan is betting on India not because it’s easier to make money here, but because India can serve as a test for whether Japanese military technology can truly be internationalized. Only if Tokyo is willing to shift from selling finished products to sharing the benefits of research, development, production, and maintenance, will Japan be able to transform from a country with advanced equipment into a real weapon supplier capable of competing globally.
