A child of five or six years old told his neighbors that they could meet in the shelter on the building at night—after the air raid siren sounded, nearby residents would take refuge there. For the child, this was perfectly normal behavior; but for neighbor Jonathan, these words became the last straw that broke the camel’s back.
According to a long report published by the Financial Times on August 16, Jonathan is a 30-something real estate professional from Tel Aviv. Initially, when his wife suggested moving overseas, he was against it. However, as the war in Gaza evolved into a prolonged regional conflict, security pressures, economic burdens, and social divisions continued to accumulate. Eventually, in 2024, he moved with his family to the United States.
The Financial Times points out that over the past three years, approximately 150,000 Israelis have left the country for extended periods. For a country with a population of over 10 million, this cannot be considered a ‘genuine exodus’. However, for Israel, which relies on immigrants to replenish its population and talent, this represents a rare reversal of direction.
Researchers at Tel Aviv University calculated based on data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics that, after excluding new immigrants who have lived in Israel for less than three years, approximately 100,000 long-term residents left Israel in 2023 and 2024. In 2025, another approximately 45,000 to 50,000 people will leave Israel. The study uses the definition of long-term departures, not including those who are on vacation, visiting family, or on short-term business trips as immigrants.
In the first half of 2025, the number of Israelis leaving the country decreased by about 20% compared to the same period in the previous year, indicating that the rate of emigration may have reached its peak. However, since the number of people moving to Israel has also decreased, researchers still expect a net outflow of population in 2025. In 2023 and 2024, Israel experienced negative net migration for two consecutive years; similar situations only occurred sporadically during the 1920s, 1950s, and 1980s over the past century.
This matter is particularly offensive because immigration is not only part of Israel's population policy, but also an integral part of its national identity.
From 1948 to 1960, foreign immigrants contributed to about 65% of Israel’s population growth. Even in the twenty years before the COVID-19 pandemic, immigrants still contributed nearly one-fifth of the population increase. In Hebrew, the term used for Jewish immigration to Israel is “aliyah”, which literally means “ascension”. Those who left Israel were once called “yordim”, meaning “descenders”.
In the 1970s, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin even used highly offensive language to criticize those who left the country. Although he later retracted his statements, “leaving” has long been seen as a betrayal of the Zionist cause. Today, a country that justifies its existence by providing homes to Jews around the world is starting to fail to retain its residents, and the flow of population itself is challenging the country's narrative.
What is even more concerning isn’t the number of people who have left, but who is leaving.
Israeli tax authorities' analysis of data from 2015 to 2024 shows that in 2023 and 2024, the departure rates among the wealthy, tech, and medical professionals reached record highs, nearly twice the levels before 2019. Doctors, engineers, high-tech professionals, and middle-aged individuals in their prime career periods made up a significant proportion of those who departed.
Ten years ago, people aged 40 to 50 accounted for about 13% of adult emigrants; today, this proportion has risen to about 20%. The average income of emigrants in the year before they left also increased, from about 125,000 new shekels between 2015 and 2019, to about 200,000 new shekels in 2024. This represents a growth of about 60%, when considering inflation. In the past, emigrants’ incomes were generally close to the national average; now, their incomes are about 50% higher than the national average.
This means that the people who leave the country are not just 150,000 people randomly selected from 10 million people, but the most important group of taxpayers, technicians, and reservists in Israel.
Israel's top 20% population contributes approximately 92% of personal income tax. The high-tech industry generates about one-fifth of the country's GDP and more than half of its exports. Workers employed in technology companies alone contribute about one-third of the national wage income tax. The impact of the departure of a scientist, doctor, or engineer on the nation's finances and industrial capabilities is far greater than what ordinary population statistics can reveal.
The Israeli tax authorities estimate that, before 2019, expatriates paid an average of about 500 million new shekels in income taxes per year, one year before leaving the country. By 2023 and 2024, this figure had risen to approximately 1.2 billion new shekels per year. Based on this calculation, each additional year of expatriation could result in a potential tax loss of about 700 million new shekels. If this trend continues for five years, the annual losses could accumulate to approximately 3.5 billion new shekels.
This figure does not mean that the government will immediately reduce taxes by the same amount. After all, some people who leave Israel retain their Israeli tax residency status, and others will return to Israel in a few years. However, it reveals a fact: those who have the ability to support Israel’s finances also have the ability to start living again in the United States, Europe, or other regions.
War is a direct factor that drives migration, but it is not the only reason.
This wave of population outflow began as early as the beginning of 2023. At that time, the Netanyahu government pushed through reforms that limited the power of the judicial system, leading to the largest protest movement in Israel’s history. Many secular, liberal, and highly educated individuals were worried that Israel was slipping away from a liberal democratic system towards a religious and autocratic politics.
The “10·7” incident and the subsequent wars further shattered confidence in safety. In just one month in October 2023, approximately 14,000 people left their homes. As the conflict spread from Gaza to Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran, rockets, recruitment orders, and bomb shelters became part of daily life. For many young families, the question is no longer whether they are safe at present, but whether their children will grow up in such conditions.
High living costs also play a role. Jonathan told the Financial Times that in Petah Tikva, near Tel Aviv, the price of an average apartment of about 100 square meters has reached nearly $1 million. He and his wife both have good jobs in Israel, yet they still can’t afford a suitable home. Less than a year after moving to the United States, they bought a property in Israel that they couldn’t afford.
Therefore, leaving the country is not entirely a hasty escape. Instead, people with educational, professional, and financial advantages re-evaluate their living costs under political, security, and economic pressures. It is precisely because they have international careers, dual citizenship, overseas relatives, or remote work opportunities that they are more likely to 'vote with their feet' than ordinary people.
The real danger is that this choice may create a self-reinforcing cycle.
The fastest-growing population group in Israel is the ultra-orthodox Jews. The employment rate of men within this group has been low for a long time, and many do not serve in the mandatory military service. At the same time, the secular middle class, high-tech professionals, and other skilled workers are not only taxpayers who contribute more taxes, but they also play an important role in the military reserve system.
If this portion of the population continues to migrate, those who remain will have to pay more taxes and serve in the military for a longer period of time. Frequent military service can also affect business operations and personal career development, further weakening economic vitality and encouraging more people with the conditions to consider leaving. This is precisely the “chain reaction” that Israeli economists are concerned about: military personnel, tax revenue, and talent are not three separate issues, but are supported by the same population.
Immigration networks may also lower the barriers to departure for newcomers. As more developed Israeli communities emerge in countries like the United States, Germany, Cyprus, and Spain, it becomes easier for newcomers to find housing, jobs, and social connections. Once moving abroad is no longer seen as a betrayal, but rather a normal choice in life, emigration could shift from a temporary decision in times of crisis to a long-term trend.
Of course, Israel is still far from population collapse. Data from the Taub Center shows that Israel’s estimated immigration outflow rate in 2024 will be slightly higher than the EU median, and it is expected to drop below the EU median in 2025. The higher birth rate means that Israel’s total population will continue to grow, though the growth rate may decline to about 0.9% in 2025, which is less than half of the average level during the decade before the pandemic.
Israel has also faced warnings of a "brain drain" in the past, but these issues have not turned into systemic crises. A easing of the war situation, changes in government, or economic recovery could potentially attract some of those who have left to return. The Israeli government has introduced tax incentives, including allowing returning talents to enjoy partial exemption from taxes on income earned abroad, as well as deducting taxes paid overseas, with the hope of attracting technology professionals back to Israel.
But tax policies can only reduce the costs of returning to Israel; they cannot address the fundamental reasons for their departure. The upcoming October elections are seen by many liberal Israelis as a critical moment that will determine the direction of the country. If the political environment changes and security conditions stabilize, some people may return to Israel. If Netanyahu and his right-wing, religious party allies continue to govern, another wave of departures could occur.
This is a real warning from the outflow of 150,000 people: the country does not currently lack population, but it may gradually lack people who are willing to pay taxes, serve in the military, innovate, and believe in the future of the country.
For a country where natural resources are limited and economy and security depend heavily on human capital, the most dangerous situation is not when everyone leaves together, but when those who have the most ability to leave and those who can afford to keep the country going first leave.
