The decades-long transfer of wartime command authority between South Korea and the United States may finally move from a situation where it is "only when conditions are met" to a situation with a clear countdown to a specific year.
On August 5, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense reported to President Li Jae-myeong that it would focus on completing the roadmap for transferring wartime command authority this year. It also aims to complete the verification of the full combat capabilities of the “Future Joint Command” during the South Korean-American security meeting scheduled for autumn. The ministry stated that this will be a “historic, epoch-making turning point.” The joint South Korean-American exercise called “Hyungbi Free Shield” held this month will also serve to assess some of these capabilities.
It should be emphasized that what South Korea and the United States are determined to set is the 'target year', rather than an unchangeable handover date.
The assessment and verification of the transfer of wartime command authority are divided into three stages: initial combat capability, comprehensive combat capability, and full mission execution capability verification. South Korea and the United States plan to complete the second stage of verification this year. After approval by the defense ministers of both countries, a target year will be proposed to the presidents of both sides. The actual date of transfer will depend on the results of the final stage of verification. In other words, even if the countdown begins, it does not mean that South Korea can skip the military capability review.
Setting the year itself means that rules have changed.
During the Korean War, South Korea handed over military command to the United Nations Command led by the United States. In 1978, the authority was transferred to the South-Korean-American Joint Command. In 1994, South Korea regained its peacetime command authority, but once the Korean Peninsula entered a state of war, the joint forces would still be commanded by a four-star general from the U.S. military.
South Korea and the United States have also set transfer dates in the past, but they were postponed due to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as concerns about South Korea's military capabilities. In 2014, both countries abandoned fixed deadlines and adopted a "conditional" transfer model: South Korea must have the ability to lead joint defense efforts, the ROK-US alliance must be capable of responding to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and the security environment on the Peninsula and in the region must be suitable for a stable transfer. This mechanism seems rigorous, but it also means that as long as one of the conditions is deemed not yet mature, the transfer can be indefinitely postponed.
What the Lee Jae-ming government is currently doing is to put this program without a deadline back onto the clock.
Lee Jae-myeong has clearly stated that he hopes to complete the transfer of authority before the end of his tenure in 2030. He believes that the South Korean-American alliance remains an important pillar of South Korea's security, but "over-reliance is not advisable." South Korea must have the ability to independently lead defense efforts on the Peninsula. South Korean Defense Minister Chung Eui-kwon refers to 2026 as "the year when wartime command will be reclaimed."
Korean media had previously speculated that Seoul hoped to set the target year at 2028, before the end of Trump’s term in office. The US military is more cautious. US Army Commander in Korea, Xavier Brunson, stated in April this year before the U.S. Congress that the current roadmap indicates 2029, and warned that “political convenience” should not override military preparations. The disagreement between the two sides does not lie in whether the transfer should take place, but rather in whether a specific year can be set first, followed by the concentration of capabilities, or whether a date can only be discussed after all conditions are met.
This is also the most noteworthy aspect of this policy change.
In the past, conditions determined time; now, South Korea hopes to use time to force conditions. This is both a political declaration of self-defense and a bargaining leverage against the United States: South Korea is unwilling to accept a sovereignty arrangement that is theoretically agreed upon but can be indefinitely postponed in reality.
However, taking back wartime command does not mean the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, nor does it mean the end of the South-Korean-U.S. alliance. The key change is that in future wars, the joint defense system will be more led by South Korean generals. South Korea still needs the United States to provide extended nuclear deterrence, intelligence reconnaissance, missile warning, and strategic reinforcements.
Therefore, the real issue is no longer whether South Korea can regain the command responsibility, but whether it is ready to take on all the responsibilities that come with that command responsibility after the countdown ends.
